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Abstract 
 
The 1990s have witnessed unprecedented attempts at privatizing state owned enterprises in virtually all OECD democra-
cies. This contribution analyzes the differences in the privatization proceeds raised by EU and OECD countries between 
1990 and 2000. It turns out that privatizations are part of a process of economic liberalization in previously highly regu-
lated economies, as well as a reaction to the fiscal policy challenges imposed by European integration and the globali-
zation of financial markets. In addition, institutional pluralism and union militancy yield significant and negative effects 
on privatization proceeds. Partisan differences only emerge if economic problems are moderate, while intense eco-
nomic, particularly fiscal, problems foreclose differing partisan strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed unprecedented efforts at privatization around the 
world, which reached their peak in the second half of the 1990s (figure 1). Between 1990 and 
2000, total privatization proceeds in more than one hundred countries amounted to 937 billion 
$U.S. (OECD 2003: 7) of which about 70 percent accrued in the thirty OECD member states. In 
turn, 62 percent of OECD members’ proceeds were generated by the fifteen member states of 
the European Union. Table 1 displays two indicators of national privatization proceeds be-
tween 1990 and 2000. To guarantee comparability, the absolute privatization proceeds (in 
million $U.S.) presented in column 1 are expressed in relation to population size (column 2) 
and as a percentage of GDP (column 3). Both indicators are strongly correlated (r = .94). The 
last column ranks the countries according to their privatization proceeds in relation to GDP. It 
turns out that Portugal, Australia and New Zealand have been frontrunners of privatization in 
the 1990s, while the laggards are Japan, Germany and the United States. Thus, notwithstand-
ing the temporal coincidence of privatizations around the globe depicted in Figure 1, signifi-
cant differences exist between countries with regard to the revenues raised from privatization 
between 1990 and 2000. In this contribution, we apply the classical theoretical approaches of 
comparative public policy research and employ macro-quantitative methods of data analysis 
to explain these differences and to identify the underlying economic and political-institutional 
determinants. 
 
Figure 1. Privatization Proceeds 1990-2000 (Mio. $ U.S.) 
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Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, No. 79 June 2001 
 
In a first step we analyze the determinants of privatization proceeds in those countries 
that were members of the EU at the end of our period of observation. However, Luxemburg 
had to be excluded due to data restrictions. Given the very small number of cases (n = 14), we 
employ a panel design in addition to a cross-sectional regression analysis. In a second step, 
we extend our sample to the long-term members of the OECD in order to test the robustness of 
our results. The East European transition economies and the OECD periphery (Mexico, Korea, 
and Turkey), as well as Iceland, Luxemborg and Switzerland were excluded from the sample.   3
We omitted the states of the first group because privatizations there were part and parcel of 
the transformation of centrally planned economies to market economies which took place dur-
ing the period of observation. The countries of the OECD periphery were not included due to 
considerable defects with regard to democracy and the rule of law, which would have made a 
most-similar-cases design implausible. Iceland, Luxemborg and Switzerland could not be 
considered because of different kinds of data restrictions.  
Privatizations may occur in various forms which, however, do not necessarily imply 
deregulation, since privatization may only change the form of government intervention con-
cerning service provision, regulation and financing (Feigenbaum et al. 1998: 6). In this paper 
we focus on the sale of state-owned enterprises. We thus neither investigate the methods of 
privatization (cf. OECD 2003) nor the utilization of the privatization proceeds.  
 
Table 1. Privatization revenues in Twenty-One OECD Countries 1990-2000 
 
Country 
1 
Privatization Proceeds 
1990-2000 
(million $U.S.)
 
2 
Proceeds per capita
1990-2000 
($U.S.) 
3 
Proceeds in % GDP 
(1990-2000) 
(1/2) 
4 
Rank 
(Proceeds/ 
GDP) 
Australia 69,661 3,764 15.94  2
Austria 10,439 1,293 5.87  11
Belgium 9,611 946 4.44  13
Canada 10,583 366 1.64  18
Denmark 6,048 1,146 4.64  12
Finland 11,000 2,137 10.00  4
France 75,488 1,263 6.14  9
Germany 21,711 265 1.22  20
Greece 12,329 1,172 8.50  8
Ireland 7,613 2,046 9.22  5
Italy 108,642 1,889 9.03  6
Japan 37,670 299 1.26  19
Netherlands 13,641 882 4.19  14
New Zealand  9,413 2,656 15.89  3
Norway 2,900 656 2.57  17
Portugal 25,292 2,544 18.24  1
Spain 37,660 957 5.93  10
Sweden 17,295 1,956 8.81  7
Switzerland 6,422 903 3.55  16
United Kingdom  42,808 735 3.92  15
USA 6,750 25 0.08  21
Mean 25,856 1,329 6.72  -
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends No. 82 (2002); Penn World Table (6.1.), own calculations.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: After a brief review of the existing 
literature (2), the most important theoretical approaches in comparative public policy research   4
are surveyed to generate testable hypotheses (3). Section 4 discusses the measurement of the 
dependent and independent variables and the respective data sources. In section 5, the 
empirical evidence is presented, while the last section concludes the study. 
 
2. Previous Research 
Most previous research on privatizations in political science has focused on the tem-
poral sequence and regional spillovers of privatizations. Earlier studies emphasized the pio-
neering role of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, which was seen as inducing 
a policy diffusion to many other countries (Abromeit 1988; Wright 1994a: 5; also Bortolotti/ 
Siniscalco 2004). More recent studies are preoccupied with the direct and indirect effects of 
European integration. Specifically, the liberalization efforts launched by the European Com-
mission in the 1980s and the fiscal policy constraints imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht are 
discussed as catalysts of privatization (S. Schmidt 1998; Scharpf 1999; Clifton et al. 2003). In 
addition, there exists a considerable number of edited or single authored volumes which focus 
on the privatization record in particular countries (cf. Vickers/Wright 1989; Clarke/Pitelis 
1993; Wright 1994; Feigenbaum et al. 1998; Toninelli 2000; Mayer 2005). 
In contrast, quantitative analyses of the determinants of differences in privatization 
proceeds are rare. An important exception is the pioneering contribution by Carles Boix 
(1997). He resorts mainly to political variables to explain the differences in privatization poli-
cies in the OECD between 1979 and 1992. According to Boix (1997), parties of the right have a 
significant positive impact on privatization proceeds, while social democratic governments 
are more reluctant in their privatization efforts. In addition, the internal fragmentation of the 
cabinet and the status as minority government inhibit privatizations, whereas a weak eco-
nomic performance prior to the period of observation was found to stimulate the sale of state-
owned enterprises (SOE). 
Bortolotti et al. (2003)
1 and Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004) compare the privatization re-
cord of 48 countries between 1977 and 1999. These authors also find evidence that political 
institutions and political parties significantly influence privatization policies. Specifically, pri-
vatization proceeds increase with a governing party of the right (measured with a dummy 
variable) and are higher in majoritarian democracies than in polities characterized by horizon-
tal and vertical fragmentation of power. Political regime types are also important as privatiza-
tion revenues in autocracies are significantly lower compared with democracies (Bortolotti/ 
Siniscalco 2004: 55). Furthermore, the authors find a significantly lower propensity to priva-
tize in German civil law countries.
2 Restricting the analysis to the OECD countries only, they 
still find significant effects of political institutions, but their ten-scale indicator of the partisan 
complexion of government fails to reach statistical significance. Nevertheless, Bortolotti and 
Siniscalco (2004: 56) suggest that “a more proper test of the partisan dimension of privatiza-
tion should be carried out in the context of wealthy and established democracies.” This paper 
attempts to fill this void by using a new data set measuring the partisan complexion of gov-
ernments. At the same time, we investigate whether the partisan effects found by Boix (1997) 
for the 1980s still exist in the 1990s, a period of marked divesture of public enterprises. Final-
ly, in contrast to Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004), we use alternative indicators to measure institu-
                                                            
1The sample of Bortolotti et al. (2003) is rather problematic. One the one hand, some OECD countries like Den-
mark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the United States are omitted without any justification, while on the other 
hand a number of developing countries are included. 
2The theoretical relevance of the variable “legal origins“ is based on the assertion that French and German civil 
law countries maintain a larger SOE sector than common law countries and that French civil law countries tend to 
have erected constitutional barriers against privatizations. Moreover, the legal protection for shareholders and 
creditors is less developed in the latter (Bortolotti/Siniscalco 2004: 49-50).   5
tional pluralism that map the influence of national constitutional rigidities directly, i.e. not via 
the detour of legal origins. 
 
3. Theories and hypotheses 
To explain the differences in the privatization proceeds of the OECD countries, we rely 
on the well-established theoretical approaches of public policy research which have been used 
fruitfully in a number of policy fields (cf. Castles 1998; M. Schmidt 2002). In the following 
we will concentrate on six approaches which, however, should not be seen as competing with 
one another. Instead, they complement each other, since every approach has particular short-
comings that can be remedied by the inclusion of variables from other approaches. 
3.1 Privatization as reaction to economic challenges? 
It can be argued that privatization represents a reaction of governments to pressing 
economic challenges. Confronted with high unemployment, dismal economic growth and ex-
cessive public debt, governments might resort to the recommendations of supply-side econo-
mists who have dominated the economic policy discourse since the 1980s (Hall 1993; Boix 
1997). According to this view, it is imperative to roll back the state’s influence on the econo-
my as far as possible to create incentives for economic activity, which in turn will result in 
stronger growth and increasing employment. Privatization of SOE plays a key role in this con-
ception since many economists have shown privately owned firms to be more efficient than 
SOE (cf. Megginson/Netter 2001; Schneider 2003). This is because SOE lack clearly defined 
goals due to government intervention and are thus confronted with sharp trade-offs between 
profit maximization and more general objectives of government policy such as employment 
or industrial policy, which may result in efficiency losses. In addition, the absence of a “hard” 
budget constraint and the capture of SOE by utility-maximizing politicians and bureaucrats 
who could exploit public enterprises to secure influence and power can lead to inferior effic-
iency of SOE. Insofar as privatization is associated with increasing market competition, further 
efficiency gains of privatization can be expected. 
Therefore, many economists suggest that privatizations stimulate economic growth 
and, in consequence, employment. Governments will most likely be more inclined to follow 
this advice if they are confronted with unsatisfactory economic performance (Zohlnhöfer 
2003). Hence, we expect a negative effect of economic growth on privatization proceeds–low 
growth will increase a government’s willingness to launch growth-stimulating measures, in-
cluding privatization. By the same token, a positive correlation between unemployment and 
privatization revenues can be imagined. 
The underlying source of these economic problems may well be the general density of 
state regulation of the economy, which even gains in importance as markets integrate further 
and governments’ competition for investment intensifies. In heavily regulated economies, suf-
fering from low growth, an economic policy approach of deregulation and privatization could 
help to break up incrusted structures and initiate impulses for growth and employment. We 
thus expect a positive effect of the initial level of political regulation of the economy on pri-
vatization revenues. 
Public finance, particularly public debt, may also have direct effects on privatization 
policies. A government confronted with a high level of public debt or–more importantly–a 
high budget deficit will search for options to tackle this problem. Most measures that aim at 
budget consolidation, namely expenditure cuts and tax increases, are unpopular among the 
voters, however. Therefore, reducing the deficit is politically difficult. Privatization of SOE 
could help governments to solve this dilemma, at least in the short run, by generating reve-
nues, reducing subsidies for SOE and eliminating the need to cover their deficits (cf. Wright   6
1994a: 20; Boix 1997: 477). Thus, privatizations can improve the budgetary situation without 
burdening taxpayers or curbing spending. In sum, privatizations should be positively related 
to budget deficits. 
3.2 Privatizations and the effects of governing parties 
The willingness with which governments will adopt basic ideas of supply-side eco-
nomics varies according to their partisan complexion. As a matter of fact, some of these ideas 
have been implemented by the conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and 
Ronald Reagan in the United States, but also–even though to a lesser extent–by the bourgeois 
coalitions which came to power in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands in the early 
1980s. Theoretically, the readiness of center-right parties to sell off state-owned enterprises is 
highly plausible, since partisan theory essentially argues that these parties favor market solu-
tions in economic policy anyway (M. Schmidt 2002; Zohlnhöfer 2003). 
Moreover, parties of the right may have an electoral incentive to implement privatiza-
tions: insofar as they succeed in allocating substantial parts of the shares of privatized enter-
prises among a large part of the electorate, thus establishing some kind of “popular capital-
ism,” the economic interests of many voters may change in favor of more market-friendly 
policies which might promise to maximize the value of their shares (Bortolotti et al. 2003: 
308). This change of economic policy interests would in turn benefit bourgeois parties, which 
will most likely be seen as the parties delivering these kinds of policies. To secure the broad 
allocation of shares among the electorate, center-right parties have a strong incentive to issue 
shares below market value. This is exactly what could be observed in Britain in the 1980s 
(Abromeit 1988; Richardson 1994: 69). 
Social democratic parties, in contrast, for a long time lacked confidence in the stability 
of the private sector. As a consequence, nationalizations of key industries figured prominently 
in these parties’ economic strategies. SOE were used as “employment buffers” during reces-
sions, as well as important instruments of macroeconomic governance. The importance social 
democratic parties attached to SOE until the 1980s (and occasionally even longer) can be seen 
from the nationalization policies of the French socialist government after 1981, as well as 
from the difficulties the leadership of the British Labour Party encountered when amending 
the party program’s notorious “Clause IV” (cf. Merkel 1993). Besides, social democratic par-
ties also faced electoral incentives to oppose privatization because employees in SOE belong to 
their core clientele and were most likely to lose some of their privileges in the case of privati-
zation. Thus, we expect bourgeois parties to be positively associated with privatization pro-
ceeds, whereas social democratic government participation should result in lower privatiza-
tion revenues. 
3.3. Institutions and Privatizations 
The decision to privatize is mostly the result of legislative processes. Therefore, it is 
likely that political institutions are of major importance for the politics of privatization. Ac-
cording to veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002) it can be argued that a change in the status quo 
will become more difficult if the number of veto players increases. The reason is that the 
transaction costs increase with the number of veto players involved in policymaking and, in 
addition, it becomes more likely that at least one of the actors will veto the privatization deci-
sion, either because of programmatic dissent or because important political allies, interest 
groups or decisive parts of the electorate oppose a privatization. Empirically, one could think 
of powerful second chambers, strong presidents or direct democracy as veto players. For 
example, French president François Mitterrand vetoed a privatization decision of the bour-
geois government under Jacques Chirac in 1986, compelling the government to modify the re-
form (Dumez/Jeunemaitre 1994: 93). In Switzerland, many efforts aiming at privatization and 
deregulation have been disapproved by the people at the cantonal level recently and Swiss   7
voters also vetoed the liberalization of the electricity market at the federal level in September 
2002 (Wagschal et al. 2002: 92). 
The procedures for changing the constitution may affect the politics of privatization, 
too, because SOE were protected by the constitution in some countries. For instance, the Portu-
guese constitution prohibited the sale of SOE until 1989 (Corkill 1994: 219-20), while the 
French constitution banned privatization of public utilities (Feigenbaum et al. 1998: 108-9). 
Until the early 1990s, the German Basic Law stipulated that the railways as well as postal ser-
vices and telecommunications be operated as public administrations (Zohlnhöfer 2001: 314). 
Thus, it can be hypothesized that privatization proceeds will be inversely related to the num-
ber and power of veto players like second chambers, presidents and referenda. In addition, the 
more difficult it is to amend the constitution, the lower privatization proceeds will be. The 
fragmentation of governments might also be hypothesized to have an effect. The direction of 
impact is not entirely clear, however. According to the logic of veto player theory discussed 
above, the following correlation should hold: the larger the number of parties in a government 
coalition the more difficult privatizations become (cf. also Boix 1997: 481f.). Nevertheless, 
there are also arguments making the opposite hypothesis plausible: if coalition governments 
aspire to reduce budget deficits–which many of them have to, given the Maastricht criteria in 
the EU–they could resort to a “lowest common denominator solution,” i.e. they might agree 
on the most uncontroversial consolidation path available. Given the political problems asso-
ciated with expenditure cuts or tax increases, privatization might in fact be that path. 
The distribution of competencies between different levels of government may also be 
relevant for the politics of privatization. SOE are not necessarily owned by the central govern-
ment in federal states. It has been widely noted, for example, that in Germany most of the 
potential for privatization was at the level of the states (Länder) and the local authorities 
(König 1988: 535-42). This might lead to low privatization proceeds of central governments 
keen on privatizing if SOE are held by local or regional authorities reluctant to sell their hold-
ings. However, this effect might be just as likely run the other way round: a central govern-
ment hostile to privatization could also be incapable of preventing regional or local authorities 
from selling their SOE. Therefore, this effect of federalism is theoretically indeterminate. A 
consistently negative effect of federalism on privatizations can only be expected if a central 
government intends to sell off an enterprise of high regional significance but is facing region-
al authorities who are opposed to the privatization and have formal or informal ways of influ-
encing the decision-making process at the federal level. Examples abound in the politics of 
privatization in Germany in the 1980s. The prime minister of the state of Bavaria, Strauß, 
initially resisted the partial privatization of the national air carrier Lufthansa because he feared 
that the strong links between the airline and the German aircraft industry, which was mainly 
situated in his state of Bavaria, would loosen after privatization. For similar reasons the prime 
minister of Lower Saxony opposed the Federal government’s sale of shares of Volkswagen 
(Zohlnhöfer 2001: 169f.). Therefore, a weak negative effect of federalism on privatization 
proceeds can be expected. 
3.4 Privatizations and the role of interest groups 
The interests of the associations of capital and labor concerning privatization policies 
diverge sharply. Most enterprises will probably support the privatization of public utilities like 
telecommunication, energy and transportation because they can hope for lower charges result-
ing from efficiency gains. In addition, they might act as buyers of shares of privatized former-
ly SOE. Nevertheless, due to diverging interests on the part of these associations, they are un-
likely to show strong dedication in favor of privatization policies. 
In contrast, labor unions, particularly those of affected employees, are likely to oppose 
privatizations. This is because employees of SOE enjoy particularly safe and well paid jobs   8
along with exemplary working conditions (cf. Schwartz 2001). Moreover, union density is 
much higher in the public sector compared with the private sector. Privatization seriously 
challenges the privileges of the SOE’s employees, as can be seen from the experiences of the 
telecommunications sector, which was liberalized and privatized throughout Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s: In the former SOE, an enormous number of jobs was shed, which the newly 
established competitors failed to compensate for. What is more, the new jobs were less secure 
and worse paid than the ones lost (Héritier/Schmidt 2000). Unions therefore had every reason 
to mobilize against the privatization of SOE and it is likely that privatization revenues decrease 
as union strength or militancy increases. 
3.5 External challenges as movers of privatization 
Privatization might also be influenced by developments beyond the national borders, 
most notably European integration and the internationalization of markets, particularly finan-
cial markets. It is often argued that the economic policies of nation-states are increasingly 
monitored, and eventually punished, by international financial markets under the conditions of 
high capital mobility. As a consequence, credibility becomes a major goal of governments 
(Freitag 2001). Thus, governments may feel obliged to switch to orthodox economic policies, 
which in turn might include the selling of SOE. Moreover, privatizations improve a govern-
ment’s budgetary position, which is of central importance for the actions of international capi-
tal markets (Mosley 2000). Hence, privatization proceeds should be positively related to the 
level of a country’s economic integration. 
European Integration can also yield an impact on privatization policies, as can be seen 
from the example of southern European countries in particular (Lavdas 1996). At least two 
ways of influence can be distinguished: first via the single market program, which led to the 
liberalization of many sectors (S. Schmidt 1998; Clifton et al. 2003). Many of the respective 
services were provided by SOE prior to liberalization. Once liberalization had taken place, the 
legitimacy of state ownership vanished. Thus, privatization became the natural option, if it 
wasn’t required for the success of the liberalization in the first place. Increasing competition 
in these markets provided another rationale for privatization: If the enterprises that had con-
trolled or monopolized the national market prior to liberalization were to succeed under con-
ditions of more intense competition on the home market, or as a “global player” in world mar-
kets, they had to be freed from the restrictions to which public enterprises more often than not 
are subject for political or administrative reasons (Wright 1994a: 4; Schmidt 1996). 
Secondly, the Maastricht deficit criteria played an important role. European govern-
ments aspiring to join monetary union had to present a public deficit of less than 3 percent of 
GDP and public debt below 60 percent of GDP in 1997. Since the latter criterion allowed for 
some exceptions, European governments above all focused on the deficit in the 1990s. There-
fore, the deficit criterion (and its follow-up in the stability and growth pact) put at least those 
governments under intense fiscal strain that ran the risk of failing. These governments in turn 
seem likely to resort to privatizations. For these reasons, a positive association between EU 
membership and privatization proceeds is expected. 
3.6 The Legacies of the Past 
Finally, one variable has to be discussed which is certainly a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for the explanation of privatization policies: the level of state ownership 
at the beginning of our period of observation. A multiplicity of reasons exists for the dif-
ferences in the size of the SOE sector and thus the potential for privatization at the disposal of 
the governments in the 1990s. Some nationalizations were pursued for military reasons, others 
were ideologically motivated, whereas still others were based on economic or industrial 
policy considerations. Finally, national industries emerged in the context of historical junc-
tures such as the Great Depression, the Second World War or the transformation from authori-  9
tarianism to democracy (cf. Toninelli 2000: 10-21). In Austria, for example, the nationaliza-
tions of the late 1940s attempted to safeguard Austrian industry from Soviet reparation 
claims. In contrast, Portugal only saw a wave of nationalizations in the wake of the revolution 
of 1974 (Corkill 1994: 215; Clifton et al. 2003: 21, 70).  
Irrespective of the diverging reasons for their emergence, the differences in the pre-
existing stock of state ownership are likely to define the policy leeway a government enjoys 
with respect to privatization policies. Obviously, a government can only privatize as many 
SOE as it owns in the first place. Therefore, privatization proceeds will be particularly low in 
countries where the government traditionally owned few enterprises (e.g. the U.S., Germany) 
or sold most of them before 1990 (e.g., the United Kingdom).  
4. Measurement, Data and Method 
The dependent variable of this study is the sum of the privatization proceeds raised in 
each of twenty OECD member-states between 1990 and 2000. The data are taken from the 
OECD’s Financial Market Trends No. 82 (2002). Unfortunately, the statistical series does not 
go back further than 1990. Therefore, earlier privatizations cannot be accounted for. In some 
cases this results in a significant underestimation of privatization proceeds. A case in point is 
Great Britain, where the Thatcher government implemented a large scale privatization pro-
gram as early as the 1980s (Abromeit 1988). Similarly, Japan started privatization early on, 
yielding almost $80 billion from the sale of the state-owned telecommunications enterprise 
NTT in 1987-88 (Megginson/Netter 2001). Nevertheless, for the better part of the OECD, priva-
tization only started to play a major role in the 1990s. Therefore, our data capture the relevant 
developments quite accurately. Since the revenues from privatization vary according to coun-
try size, standardization is necessary, however. Thus, the privatization proceeds of each coun-
try are divided by that country’s average GDP in the period between 1990 and 2000. 
To minimize the bias resulting from the missing data on privatization proceeds in the 
1980s, one needs to control for the stock of state-owned enterprises at the beginning of our 
period of observation. This is not easy to measure, however. The “European Centre of Enter-
prises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest” (CEEP 2000) 
provides an index that includes the number of salaried employees, gross added value and 
gross capital formation of enterprises with majority public participation in the non-agricultural 
merchantable economy. This indicator seems to be well suited to depict the level of state own-
ership. It is only available for EU member states, however, and equivalent data for the other 
OECD countries are lacking. For the analysis of the OECD sample we used the indicator “Gov-
ernment Enterprises and Public Sector Investment as a share of the economy” of the “Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World Report” (Gwartney/Lawson 2000) instead. 
The data for the partisan composition of governments is taken from Schmidt et al. 
(2000). These data provide the cabinet participation of ten party families on a daily basis. We 
use two different indicators of partisan complexion of government: the cabinet share of left 
parties and that of center-right parties. Social democratic, socialist and (post-)communist 
parties were classified as left parties, while liberal, conservative, Christian democratic and 
right parties, as well as parties of the center that are not Christian democratic, were catego-
rized as bourgeois parties. Note that these indicators do not consider the cabinet shares of 
agrarian, regional and green parties, as well as unaffiliated cabinet members. The same source 
has been used for the indicator of government fragmentation, namely the number of coalition 
partners in a given government. 
For the institutional variables, the indicators developed by Huber et al. (1993), Colo-
mer (1996) and Schmidt (2000) are employed to check for the effects of institutional barriers 
against privatization (source: Schmidt 2000). In addition, the impact of specific institutions 
like federalism, bicameralism and constitutional rigidity is of interest. To test their effects,   10
data compiled by Lijphart (1999) are used. Moreover, his indices of federalism, bicameralism 
and constitutional rigidity were standardized and, on that basis, two additive indices have 
been calculated. 
The indicators measuring economic problem pressures are taken from the OECD’s Eco-
nomic Outlook Database except for the economic growth data, which are taken from Maddi-
son (2003). Regarding public finance, both public debt and the budget deficit are considered. 
With respect to budget deficits, we constructed an indicator reflecting the number of years be-
tween 1990 and 1995 in which the country’s deficit exceeded 3 percent of GDP.
3 The 3 percent 
threshold has played an enormous symbolic role in the EU member-states since the adoption 
of the Maastricht Treaty and its convergence criteria, but may also have diffused to countries 
outside the EU as a benchmark. To measure the impact of economic growth performance, two 
variables have been calculated: first the deviation from the mean of the OECD countries during 
the period of observation, second an indicator which takes into account the diverging catch-up 
potential of nations emphasized by neoclassical growth theory. Thus, the residuals from a re-
gression of the log of GDP per capita in 1985 on the average economic growth between 1985-
95 were employed to map the relative growth performance (for the theoretical background, cf. 
Obinger 2004). 
As a further indicator for economic challenges, we test the general level of state regu-
lation of the economy at the beginning of the period of observation, measured by the Econom-
ic Freedom Index developed by Gwartney/Lawson (2000). This index had to be modified, 
however, since in its original version it included the variable “Government Enterprises and 
Public Sector Investment as a share of the economy,” which is already used as an indicator of 
the original level of state ownership. 
The strength and militancy of labor unions is measured via union density at the begin-
ning of the 1990s (data from Castles 1998) and the number of working days lost per 1,000 
employees due to industrial conflicts respectively (data from Armingeon et al. 2004). The 
hypotheses concerning the international determinants of privatization policies are tested with 
an indicator that reflects the number of years between 1990 and 1995 a country’s deficit has 
exceeded 3 percent of GDP and by using an indicator of economic openness provided by Ar-
mingeon et al. (2004), which depicts different aspects of financial openness. In addition, we 
included a dummy variable to estimate the effects of EU membership. 
In the following statistical analysis, the hypotheses generated in section 3 are tested 
with simple cross-sectional regressions. We use two samples, first the member-states of the 
EU, and second the long-term members of the OECD. Unless mentioned otherwise previously, 
all independent variables are averages over the period of observation. In order to increase the 
number of observations we also estimated a panel model for the EU sample. For that purpose, 
the period of observation was split into three sub-periods (1990-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-
2000). This periodization is for two reasons. On the one hand, the CEEP’s (2000) data for the 
level of state ownership are only available for 1991, 1995 and 1998. On the other hand, this 
periodization allows for identifying temporal effects connected to the convergence criteria of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the European Stability and Growth Pact. For the OECD sample, data 
of similar quality for the size of the public enterprise sector do not exist which precludes the 
estimation of panel regressions. Nevertheless, given the larger number of cases, a panel de-
sign does not necessarily seem to be required.  
 
                                                            
3The restriction to the first half of the 1990s rules out problems of endogeneity since, other things being equal, 
privatizations reduce budget deficits. 
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5. Empirical findings 
5.1. European Union 
Table 2 summarizes the regression results for the fourteen EU member states. Speci-
fications 1 and 2 report the findings of the cross-section analysis. In both models the influ-
ences of political and economic variables are jointly estimated. As expected, the coefficient of 
the initial level of state ownership shows a negative sign and is significant at the 5-percent 
level. The same is true for the indicator measuring the effect of bicameralism, federalism and 
constitutional rigidity. The partisan complexion of government, in contrast, does not gain sta-
tistical significance. The signs of the coefficients show the theoretically expected direction of 
influence but both coefficients remain statistically insignificant (1 vs. 2). In contrast, the vari-
ables measuring economic challenges and labor militancy have a major impact on privatiza-
tion revenues. While it turns out that a high level of industrial conflict significantly decreases 
privatization proceeds, a high level of regulation of the economy at the start of the period of 
observation and a frequent violation of the 3 percent deficit criterion yields a catalyzing effect 
on privatizations. Thus, other things being equal, privatization proceeds tend to increase the 
more often a country’s budget deficit exceeds 3 percent of GDP, the more heavily the economy 
was regulated at the beginning of the period of observation,
4 the larger the public enterprise 
sector was at the beginning of the 1990s, the fewer working days were lost due to industrial 
conflict and the larger the institutional leeway for a government was in a country. All other 
variables discussed above did not gain statistical significance in the cross section analysis (not 
reported). This applies for economic openness, economic growth, unemployment, public debt 
at the beginning of the period of observation, union density and government fragmentation. 
                                                            
4Note that higher values of the index indicate a lower level of regulation of the economy.   12
 
Table 2: Determinants of Privatization proceeds in Fourteen EU member states 
  Dependent Variable: Privatization proceeds in % GDP (Period means) 
 Cross-section 
(1990-2000) 
Panel (1990-94,1995-1997, 1998-2000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 40.11*** 
(8.62) 
43.09*** 
(8.60) 
1.63 
(1.49) 
2.64* 
(1.41) 
1.65 
(1.62) 
2.37 
(1.65) 
Initial size of SOE sector  .23** 
(.08) 
.21** 
(.08) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.14** 
(.07) 
.17** 
(.07) 
Cabinet share of bourgeois 
parties 
.04 
(.03) 
 .007 
(.010) 
 .007 
(.01) 
.009 
(.01) 
Bicameralism, federalism & 
constitutional rigidity 
-2.80** 
(.88) 
-2.85** 
(.93) 
-1.58*** 
(.52) 
-1.66*** 
(.51) 
-1.59*** 
(.52) 
-1.69*** 
(.54) 
Budget deficit > 3%  
of GDP 
.65** 
(.25) 
.55* 
(.23) 
.40** 
(.18) 
.38** 
(.17) 
.41** 
(.18) 
.52*** 
(.19) 
Economic freedom 
1990 
-4.48*** 
(.99) 
-4.34*** 
(1.03) 
    
Number of working days lost 
 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
Cabinet share of left parties    -.03 
(.03) 
 -.012 
(.01) 
  
Unemployment  rate       .006 
(.09) 
 
Government debt as % GDP            -.015 
(.01) 
Dummy (1995-97)      .10 
(.74) 
.16 
(.73) 
  
Dummy (1998-00)      2.25*** 
(.79) 
2.36*** 
(.77) 
2.20*** 
(.67) 
2.37*** 
(.68) 
R
2 .92  .91  .47  .49  .47  .51 
Adj. R
2 .85  .84  .36  .37  .35  .39 
N 14  14  39  39  39  38 
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients, OLS-standard errors in parenthesis. * p≤ .10; ** p≤ .05; *** p≤ 
.01; Cross section: cabinet share of parties = Mean 1989-2000; Number of working days lost = Mean 1989-
2000. Budget deficit = number of years between 1990 and 1995 in which the 3-percent criterion of the Maas-
tricht treaty has been violated. 
Panel: On the basis of a Langrange-Multiplier test a classic OLS-regression has been computed. With the excep-
tion of the level of public debt and the size of the SOE sector, which are measured at the beginning of each pe-
riod, all independent variables are averages over the periods 1990-95, 1995-1997 and 1998-2000. The budget 
deficit variable is lagged by one period (for the first sub-period [1990-1995] the period 1989-1991 was used) to 
avoid endogeneity problems.  
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Admittedly, the number of degrees of freedom has been strained in these two models. 
To inflate the number of observations and to check for the robustness of the findings, we esti-
mated a panel model (specifications 3-6). Due to multicollinearity we did not jointly estimate 
the Economic Freedom index and the initial size of the public sector
5. To identify temporal-
specific effects, we have used dummy variables for each period. In particular, we expect a 
positive effect for the period 1995-97 because the pressures on the member states to consoli-
date their budgets were particularly high during the run up to the reference year of the 
Maastricht criteria in 1997.  
The regression results are consistent with the findings of the cross-sections analysis. 
Again, there are no significant partisan effects, while the coefficients of the other independent 
variables show the theoretically expected signs and remain significant. With respect to the 
economic pressures, we did not find any significant effects for the rate of unemployment (5), 
the level of public debt at the beginning of the period (6), economic growth and trade open-
ness (not reported). In contrast, the significant positive effect of high budget deficits on priva-
tization revenues remains robust. Surprisingly, only the dummy of the final sub-period turns 
out to be significant. One reason for this could be that, in contrast to the two preceding sub-
periods, significant partisan differences have appeared in the period 1998-2000. This interpre-
tation is supported by the results of cross-section regressions for each of the three sub-periods. 
While the effects of the other variables discussed remain robust in all three regressions and 
the partisan complexion of the government fails to reach statistical significance in the first 
two sub-periods, we estimated a significant positive impact of bourgeois parties on privatiza-
tion proceeds for the period 1998-2000 (not reported in table 2).
6 
5.2. OECD 
We were not able to replicate the empirical findings for the EU members in a cross- 
section analysis of twenty OECD countries. Only the negative effects of a heavily regulated 
economy on privatization proceeds remained significant, whereas neither the political nor the 
other economic variables reached statistical significance (not shown in table 3). However, this 
result is exclusively driven by the Australian case and we were able to identify the partisan 
complexion of government as the variable causing the model to collapse. In Australia, just as 
in neighboring New Zealand, the Labour Party adopted rather far-reaching market-oriented 
economic policies since the 1980s. The programmatic stances of the antipodean Labour par-
ties regarding economic policy in the 1980s cannot be regarded as typical for other social de-
mocratic parties, however. “Australia and even more New Zealand were the only OECD na-
tions in which Labour/Social Democratic governments sought to actively transform society 
and economy toward a ‘more market’ model on a scale comparable with the ambitions of the 
right” (Castles et al. 1996: 2). The reasons for the singular path chosen by these Labour par-
ties lie in the remarkable crises both political economies experienced in the early 1980s, 
which were not resolved by the respective conservative parties that governed both countries 
for most of the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Schwartz 2000: 92.; 110). Since Australia and New Zea-
land belonged to the most heavily regulated economies in the OECD, a turn to even more state 
intervention may not have seemed plausible. Therefore, both the economic situation and party 
competition incited the left parties to adopt liberal economic policy stances (cf. Castles et al. 
1996; Quiggin 1998). The New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP), however, was voted out of of-
fice in 1990 and suffered a split in its right wing around the former Finance Minister, Roger 
                                                            
5The correlation between the size of the public enterprise sector and the level of regulation of the economy is r = 
.65.  
6The sign of the coefficient of the dummy for the period 1998-2000 might also suggest that after the inception of 
the European stability pact the efforts at privatizations have been further intensified, possibly to prevent sanc-
tions and to increase credibility in the context of EMU. This interpretation does not seem too plausible, though, 
given the amelioration of the budgetary situation throughout the EU in the second half of the 1990s.   14
Douglas. When the NZLP resumed power in December 1999, its economic policy position had 
come close to the social democratic mainstream again, and its singular programmatic position 
in the 1980s thus does not pose a problem for our analysis. The Australian Labour Party (ALP) 
in contrast, remained in power until March 1996 and its deviant programmatic position thus 
heavily influenced the politics of privatization in Australia.
7 Therefore, we excluded Australia 
from our sample.
8 
The empirical findings for the thus modified model are summarized in table 3 and 
largely coincide with the results for the EU sample reported in table 2. Nevertheless, for the 
OECD sample we find significant partisan influences on privatization proceeds which failed to 
reach statistical significance in the EU sample: right parties opted for privatization more ex-
tensively than left parties did (cf. equations 7 vs. 8). Regarding the other variables, the estima-
tions for the OECD sample resemble the ones of the EU sample. We again find a positive rela-
tion between the initial size of the SOE sector and privatization proceeds. In line with the EU 
findings, an initially high density of regulation of the economy and high levels of industrial 
conflicts exert highly significant effects on revenues from privatization. While strikes tend to 
inhibit privatizations, a low level of economic freedom at the beginning of our period of ob-
servation operated as a stimulus for privatizations. In addition, we again find that high budget 
deficits are pertinent to privatizations. Regarding political institutions, we find the same nega-
tive effect of institutional pluralism on privatization proceeds we already reported for the EU. 
All indicators used to measure institutional pluralism, i.e. the index of bicameralism, federal-
ism and constitutional rigidity adopted from Lijphart (7-12), Colomer’s (1996) index of insti-
tutional pluralism as well as the indicators developed by Huber et al. (1993) and Schmidt 
(2000) (not presented in table 3) turn out to be significantly and negatively related to privati-
zation proceeds. We also tested Lijphart’s indices of federalism, constitutional rigidity and bi-
cameralism separately and again detected a statistically significant negative impact (not pre-
sented in table 3). 
                                                            
7The ALP committed itself to privatization comparatively late (Quiggin 1998: 87). Nevertheless, the party acted 
as a pacemaker for Australian privatization policies, which had consequences far beyond its own term of office. 
Particularly the conservative Howard government’s extensive privatization program benefited from the ALP’s 
previous liberal economic policy stance for two reasons. First, the “National Competition Policy Act” adopted by 
the ALP government laid the groundwork for further liberal reforms, particularly in the SOE sector (Quiggin 1998: 
81). Second, given the previous policies of the ALP, the Howard government’s privatization program appeared 
without alternative. Thus, the tempering effects which the competition with a traditional social democratic party 
might have yielded on Howard’s privatization program failed to materialize (cf. Greenfield/Williams 2003: 
295f.). A more detailed study of Australian privatization policies is needed, which is, however, beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
8The results reported below do not change substantially if Australia is included and the ALP is coded as a center 
party (for this kind of procedure cf. Siegel 2002).   15
Table 3: Determinants of Privatization proceeds in Twenty OECD member states 
  Dependent Variable: Privatization proceeds in % GDP 
Cross section (1990-2000) 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Intercept 45.36*** 
(7.96) 
51.86*** 
(8.41) 
46.90*** 
(7.74) 
44.57*** 
(9.14) 
41.94*** 
(8.14) 
58.15*** 
(9.45) 
Initial size of SOE sector  0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.24** 
(0.08) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
Economic freedom 
1990 
-5.39*** 
(0.97) 
-4.82*** 
(1.05) 
-5.76*** 
(0.97) 
-5.47*** 
(1.08) 
-5.24*** 
(0.95) 
-6.85*** 
(1.12) 
Cabinet share of bourgeois 
parties 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
 0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Bicameralism, Federalism and 
Constitutional Rigidity 
-5.06*** 
(0.90) 
-4.95*** 
(0.98) 
-4.82*** 
(0.89) 
-5.10*** 
(0.96) 
-5.22*** 
(0.88) 
-4.47*** 
(0.85) 
Budget deficit > 3%  
of GDP 
0.72*** 
(0.20) 
0.58** 
(0.22) 
0.72*** 
(0.19) 
0.72*** 
(0.21) 
0.69*** 
(0.20) 
0.64*** 
(0.19) 
Number of working days lost  -0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
Cabinet share of left parties    -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
    
Fragmentation of Government      0.49 
(0.35) 
   
Openness (1989-2000)        0.10 
(0.49) 
  
Government debt as % GDP 
1989 
     2.16 
(1.63) 
 
Economic growth 1985-1995 
(Deviation from OECD-
Mean) 
      -1.08* 
(0.53) 
R
2  .92 .90 .93 .92 .93 .94 
Adj. R
2  .87 .85 .88 .86 .88 .90 
N 19  19  19  19  19  19 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients, OLS-standard errors in parenthesis. * p≤ .10; ** p≤ .05; 
 *** p≤ .01. 
 
Finally, the variables which yielded insignificant results in the EU sample (unemploy-
ment, public debt, union density, economic openness, and the number of governing parties) 
also turned out to remain insignificant in the OECD sample. Equation 9 reports the results for 
the fragmentation of government. In contrast to Boix (1997), we find a positive but insignifi-
cant effect of government fragmentation on privatization proceeds. In terms of economic 
openness, in line with our expectations, the estimated coefficient suggests that open econo-
mies, other things being equal, show greater propensity to sell off public enterprises (10). The 
coefficient is highly insignificant, however. The same is true for the EU dummy, which is also 
positively but highly insignificantly related to privatization proceeds (not presented). These 
findings might lead to the conclusion that globalization and European integration do not cata-  16
lyze privatizations per se, but that both phenomena only exert effects on countries that are 
confronted with considerable economic problem loads. 
The coefficient for public debt also displays the expected sign
9, but remains insignifi-
cant (11). Finally, unlike in the EU sample, a dismal growth performance, measured as the 
deviation from the average growth rate in the OECD between 1985 and 1995, turns out to be 
significant at the 10-percent-level in the OECD sample. According to the sign of the respective 
coefficient, countries with below average growth rates have privatized more than economi-
cally flourishing countries (12). 
 
6. Conclusion 
What conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence? Apparently, the differ-
ences in privatization proceeds of western democracies can primarily be traced back to the 
varying economic problem loads these countries face. But political variables also help to ex-
plain the national variations in the revenues from the sales of state-owned enterprises. At least 
the findings for the broader OECD comparison suggest that the partisan complexion of govern-
ment still plays a role. In this respect, the findings of Boix (1997) could be replicated in prin-
ciple. Remarkable differentiations have to be introduced, however. Our analysis did not un-
cover significant partisan differences in the EU, while Australia had a substantial leverage on 
the estimated impact of political parties in the broader OECD comparison. Therefore, our find-
ings suggest that the impact of the partisan complexion of government on privatization poli-
cies has become more fragile in recent years. 
Specifically, partisan differences seem to have become conditional; they only occur if 
economic problems are controlled for. That is to say, parties which are confronted with in-
tense economic, particularly fiscal, problems adopt similar policy responses–at least in the 
case of privatization policies. We have identified three economic challenges which have 
prompted privatizations irrespective of the partisan orientation of the government of the day, 
namely an initially high regulatory density, a frequent violation of the (symbolic) deficit 
threshold of 3 percent of GDP and–only in the OECD sample–an inferior growth performance. 
Privatizations thus can be seen as part of a policy of economic liberalization in previously 
highly regulated economies as well as a reaction to the fiscal policy challenges imposed by 
European integration and the globalization of financial markets. This result underscores the 
growing importance of supranational and transnational influences on national policymaking 
and could also provide a clue for the explanation of the differences we found between the EU 
and the OECD samples. Apparently, the single market program and particularly the Maastricht 
criteria have set in motion a strong process of convergence within the EU which has leveled 
partisan differences in this policy field. The interpretation that partisan differences disappear 
if governments are exposed to substantial economic problem pressures could also explain the 
positive effect of bourgeois parties on privatization proceeds we found for the EU in a cross-
sectional regression for the period 1998-2000. In the second half of the 1990s, the budgetary 
situation has improved in all EU member states and after 1997 the decision concerning mem-
bership in EMU had finally been taken. As a result, there might have emerged some leeway for 
partisan differences at the end of the decade. 
Boix (1997) holds that parties, unable to pursue distinct macroeconomic policies any-
more because of international financial markets, now turn to diverging supply-side policies. 
This claim has to be modified. Possibly, in times of austerity even social democratic parties 
prefer the political advantage of gaining extra revenues without major political conflicts via 
                                                            
9Note that we estimated a negative coefficient in the EU panel regressions (cf. table 2).    17
privatization to the opportunity of employing the public sector to improve productivity of 
capital and labor as Boix (1997: 479) would argue.  
This run into privatization induced by economic challenges irrespective of partisan 
control of the government might also explain why we were not able to replicate the impeding 
effect of multi-party coalitions reported by Boix (1997).
10 It seems that the tensions resulting 
from a privatization decision within a coalition have dramatically decreased during the last 
twenty years, possibly also as a result from converging party platforms. According to the 
logic of blame avoidance, coalition partners might indeed find as many arguments for as 
against a given privatization.  
In addition to the increasing importance of transnational and supranational influences 
on national economic policies, domestic institutional settings like federalism and constitution-
al rigidity remain important. Our empirical evidence is not only in accordance with the results 
reported by Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004), who identified majoritarian democracies as a catalyst 
for privatizations, but also corroborates veto player theory claiming a status quo bias of coun-
tries with many veto players. Finally, severe industrial conflicts reduce privatizations. Appar-
ently, it is not the unions’ organizational strength but their conflict behavior that is decisive 
for the successful implementation of privatization programs, as can be seen from the fact that 
the number of working days lost due to strikes, and not union density, has statistically proven 
to be of decisive influence. 
 
                                                            
10Note that we used a different indicator of government fragmentation. Boix (1997) employed the Rae index 
whereas we used the number of parties in government. The fact that we were not only unable to replicate the 
findings with our indicator but that even the sign of the respective coefficient changed seems to put the robust-
ness of the effects of government fragmentation on privatization proceeds seriously in question. This is not too 
much of a surprise, however, since the effect is indeterminate at the theoretical level as well (see above).   18
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